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OSCE at the Crossroads 
 
 
This paper deals with the situation of and challenges to the OSCE following the Vienna Min-
isterial of 2000. The first part analyses the reasons behind the failure of the Ministerial. The 
second deals with the European Union's somewhat ambiguous approach to the OSCE. 
Thirdly, the paper will consider some of the deliberations of participating States as to how the 
Russian Federation could better be involved in the activities of the OSCE. In section four, the 
paper examines the challenges and tasks the OSCE is facing under Romanian Chairmanship 
2001. 
 
 
1. The Failure of the 2000 Vienna Ministerial 2000 
 
The 8th OSCE Ministerial held in Vienna on 27 and 28 November 2000 was the first top-level 
meeting in the history of the "new" C/OSCE since the end of the Cold War to finish without 
agreement on a final communiqué. The Chairperson-in-Office (CiO), the Austrian Foreign 
Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner, was forced to concede that "it was not possible to achieve 
consensus on all the elements of a Ministerial Declaration". Instead she delivered a unilateral 
"Statement by the Chairperson-in-Office"1 which was immediately opposed by the delegation 
of the Russian Federation, who declared: "The propositions and conclusions contained in the 
statement on a whole range of questions connected with the OSCE's activities and the assess-
ment of the situations in various participating States do not correspond to the actual circum-
stances and fail to reflect the entire spectrum of opinions of OSCE participating States. […] 
The Russian Federation does not consider itself bound by any of the conclusions or recom-
mendations contained in the statement."2 This statement also received critical comments from 
the US delegate, who declared that "the remarks that you [the Austrian CiO] made were not 
made on the basis of consensus, and in so far as they were novel and new, none of us are 
bound by them as commitments under the OSCE. But insofar as they were a repetition of 
commitments or obligations previously undertaken under the OSCE […], they remain com-
mitments and obligations of us all."3 Given the fact that each and every major C/OSCE meet-
ing since the end of the Cold War was able to agree on a final communiqué, the Vienna Min-
isterial must be seen as a major political failure. 
 
Aside from the failure to produce a final declaration, the Ministerial was able to reach some 
decisions: it adopted the "Vienna Declaration on the Role of the OSCE in South-Eastern 
Europe"4 (although this contains little that had not already been agreed on) as well as a decla-
ration on "Enhancing the OSCE's Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings"5. The 
meeting also managed to appoint a new OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 
the Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekéus, who will take office on 1 July 2001.6 At the same time, the 
                                                 
1 Statement by the Chairperson-in-Office, MC(8). JOUR/2, 28 November 2000, Annex 2, in: 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/mcs/8vienna00e.htm, as of 17 April 2001 (all internet sources 
are from this date). 
2  Interpretative statement under paragraph 79 of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, 
MC(8).JOUR/2, 28 November 2000, Annex 3, in: ibid. 
3  Interpretative statement under paragraph 79 of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, 
MC(8).JOUR/2, 28 November 2000, Annex 4, in: ibid. 
4  MC(8).JOUR/2, 28 November 2000, Annex 1, in: ibid. 
5 Decision No. 1, Enhancing the OSCE's Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, MC(8).DEC/1, 28 
November 2000, in: ibid. 
6  The current incumbent, Max van der Stoel, will stay in office until 30 June 2001 (cf. Decision No. 2, Ap-
pointment of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, MC(8).DEC/2, 28 November 2000, in: ibid). 
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Ministerial failed to agree on the extension of the appointment of the OSCE Representative on 
Freedom of the Media, with the decision deferred for a a maximum period of six months, and 
Freimut Duve staying in office accordingly.7 There was agreement on the Chairmanship for 
the year 2002 (Portugal), and on the date and venue of the next Ministerial Council or Summit 
(Bucharest, November/December 2001),8 but no consensus could be reached on the "Scale for 
Large OSCE Missions" and "Police-Related Activities",9 with a decision simply that the dis-
cussions should be continued . 
 
The failure of the Vienna Ministerial raises three sets of questions. The first concerns the rea-
sons why it was impossible to reach consensus on some of the most important questions dis-
cussed. Second, it raises a question about the political significance of the outcome of the Vi-
enna Ministerial: is the OSCE in a state of crisis, or is it about to reach such a crisis? Third 
and perhaps most importantly, one has to ask what conclusions the participating States have 
drawn from the lack of results of the 8th OSCE Ministerial. 
 
According to press reports, the central reason for the Ministerial's failure was the Russian 
Federation's position on a number of regional issues (Chechnya, Georgia, 
Moldova/Transnistria).10 Yet while regional issues undoubtedly played an important role (see 
chapter 4.3), the real picture is far more complex. Russian dissatisfaction with the OSCE and 
its activities was indeed the most important reason for the failure to reach compromises of the 
kind the Russian government agreed to at the Istanbul Summit 1999. However, the reasons for 
this unwillingness to make concessions did not flow solely from differences over regional 
issues. Months before the Ministerial and again in January 2001 the Russian delegation in-
formed its Western partners of its main concerns and demands.11 Drawing on these two 
documents the Russian position can be summarised in two main points. 
 
First, Russia is concerned that the OSCE is only active in the Eastern part of Europe and, 
moreoever, is overly concentrating its activities here on the human dimension. The Russian 
perception is that some Western States are trying to impose their values and structures on 
Eastern states, while at the same time trying to avoid OSCE involvement in the problems of 
Western States. This accusation of 'double standards' is shared to a certain degree by Ukraine 
and other participating States. Russia is arguing in favour of a broader OSCE agenda, which 
would incorporate the following issue areas: 
 
· "Integration processes in the euroatlantic space as a key factor of its development. […] 
Security in Europe as a key element of strategic stability. Subregional topics. […] In-
terinstitutional co-operation in the OSCE area; 
· problems of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and anti-missile de-
fense in the OSCE space; 
· political extremism in various forms (including neo-nazism) […]; 
· coordination of efforts to combat international terrorism; 
                                                 
7  Decision No. 3, Extension of the Appointment of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 
MC(8).DEC/3, 28 November 2000, in: ibid. 
8  Decision No. 4, Chairmanship in the Year 2002, MC(8).DEC/4; Decision No. 5, Next Ministerial Coun-
cil/Summit, MC(8).DEC/5, in: ibid. 
9  Decision No. 6, Scale for Large OSCE Missions, MC(8).DEC/6; Decision No. 7, Police-Related Activities, 
MC(8).DEC/7, in: ibid. 
10 Cf. i.e. Ewen MacAskill, Moscow blocks OSCE's Chechen 'lecture' on rights, in: Guardian Unlimited, in: 
www.guardian.co.uk/archive/Article/0,4273,4097737,00.html. 
11  Cf. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation, Agenda for the OSCE, PC.DEL/2/01, 8 January 2001; 
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation, Russian View on Directions of the Discussion on Optimiza-
tion of the Functioning of the Permanent Council and Related Bodies, PC.DEL/3/01, 8 January 2001. 
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· situation of national minorities in the OSCE region; 
· ensuring democratic elections in the whole OSCE area in accordance with the Copen-
hagen criteria […];" 
· "topics of migration and statelessness;" 
· "promotion of cooperation between States in the field of economics and environment, 
science, technology and culture."12 
 
It is quite clear that the Russian Federation is targeting issue areas such as national minorities 
or ensuring democratic elections that should be dealt with 'in the whole OSCE area', including 
Western participating States. Russia wants a 'more balanced' OSCE agenda which would 
avoid the impression that only the Russian Federation (and other 'Eastern' countries) are con-
sistently the objects of Western criticism for not having lived up to OSCE commitments. 
 
Second, Russia demands a more concrete formalisation of OSCE working bodies and proce-
dures. Concrete proposals in this respect include more regular written reports by missions and 
OSCE institutions, the rationalisation of the work of the Permanent Council (PC), a revalua-
tion of the role of the Preparatory Committee, and the introduction of orderly working proce-
dures, i.e. the establishment of working groups. These proposals would appear to serve two 
main objectives. First, the Russian Federation wants to guarantee that sensitive issues are 
dealt with behind closed doors and not in the current format of the PC with "attendance of 
unauthorized persons, like students or journalists, and by shunning publicity of draft docu-
ments and statements of Participating States."13 The second Russian objective seems to be to 
limit the political margin of manoeuvre of the Chairman-in-Office and of the Heads of Mis-
sions (HoMs). Accordingly, the document of the Russian Permanent Mission explicitly asks 
for "[s]trict compliance by the Chairman-in-Office with the official position of the OSCE" 
and demands "[r]enunciation of one-sided statements made on behalf of the OSCE as well as 
of statements lacking consensual backing."14 The background behind these demands is the 
fact that the somewhat hybrid structure of the OSCE strengthens the power positions of the 
CiO, the HoMs, the heads of OSCE institutions as well as those of the bigger and/or richer 
participating States, which by seconding personnel and/or making voluntary contributions are 
able to considerably shape the organisation's activities and profile. Russia, however, almost 
entirely lacks these possibilities. It is only weakly represented in OSCE structures and does 
not have the financial means to second many personnel. Thus the Russian Federation is at-
tempting to strengthen its power position by a greater formalisation of the OSCE in order to 
curtail some of the more informal procedures that work to the advantage of Western partici-
pating States.  
 
The most serious point of contention between Russia and the OSCE, however, was and still 
remains NATO's air campaign on Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and 
the role played by the OSCE in this. During this campaign Russia had to confront the fact that 
it does not have a veto in European security affairs. Additionally, it had to give up any lin-
gering illusions about the possibility of OSCE becoming a counterbalance to NATO influ-
ence. On the contrary, from the Russian perspective the Kosovo Verification Mission was a 
direct preparation for the ensuing NATO air campaign.  
 
"[The] Kosovo Verification Mission precedent, established in 1998-1999, linked the 
OSCE to NATO in such a way that in practice it was subordinated in certain military as-
                                                 
12  Agenda for the OSCE, ibid. 
13  Russian View on Directions of the Discussion on Optimization of the Functioning of the Permanent Council 
and Related Bodies, cf. footnote 11. 
14  Ibid. 
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pects to the political processes of the alliance (military reporting, intelligence data). Obvi-
ously, the OSCE Mission served as a cloak or cover for certain activities of NATO states 
that were part of the preparations for war."15  
 
From Russia's point of view the co-operative context of the OSCE was abused for an unilat-
eral military engagement lacking a valid legal basis, namely a UN mandate. The fact that after 
the war the OSCE was not entrusted with the mandate for the whole Kosovo Mission, as en-
visaged at Rambouillet, but instead comprised just one of four (now three) pillars of UNMIK 
was a direct consequence of the Russian perception of its role in the Kosovo war. A decisive 
factor for this move was the Russian Federation's assessment that its power position in the UN 
was stronger than the one it enjoyed in the OSCE. On the other hand, the OSCE was not, and 
is still not in a position to single-handedly manage the comprehensive task of rebuilding a 
whole society. 
 
The fact that the Russian Federation had compromised at the 1999 Istanbul summit on 
Kosovo, Chechnya and almost all other issues fed the illusion in the West that Russia had 
already "swallowed" the Kosovo issue. In reality, however, Russia's reaction within the OSCE 
on the Kosovo question was simply delayed for a year. From the current Russian perspective 
the Istanbul summit represents a defeat caused by a weak Russia and a weak Russian presi-
dent, whereas now Russia is led by a strong president. The dominant Russian motivation be-
fore the Vienna Ministerial - which was clearly communicated to major Western participating 
States months before this event -, was to avoid a 'second Istanbul'. It seems as if this was not 
taken sufficiently serious by Western participating States. 
 
It was with this central objective in mind that the Russian Federation approached the Vienna 
Ministerial. Consequently, the meeting's failure was not an accident or the consequence of an 
inability to reach consensus on particular questions, but was much more the result of a delib-
erate Russian strategy. The Russian Federation wanted to demonstrate that it was not ready to 
bow to every Western demand and that it was prepared to use its veto for the first time. While 
the strategic and pre-planned character of the Russian approach to the Ministerial is quite 
clear, it is open to question whether the Russian Federation consciously sought the failure of 
the meeting from the outset, or whether it had decided not to go below a certain minimum 
position. An even more important question remains unclear: does the Russian Federation take 
its above-mentioned demands seriously, or is its main concern to keep the OSCE out of con-
flicts in Russia proper as well as in its 'near abroad'? Only future developments can provide 
answers to this question, which is of critical importance: if Russia is really interested in a 
'more balanced' and enlarged OSCE agenda, then certain changes in this direction might well 
be possible. If, however, the Russian Federation's main interest consists in keeping the OSCE 
out of the crisis regions in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, then a common approach 
would be extremely difficult to reach. Keeping the OSCE out of these regions would conflict 
with its basic political rationale. In one sense, at least in the short term Russia can be satisfied 
with the outcome of the Vienna Ministerial. Everybody in the OSCE context is now preoccu-
pied with 'Russia handling', with the result that the Russian Federation enjoys a level of at-
tention it did not have before.  
 
The results of the 8th Ministerial also reflect the overall political situation, especially Russian-
US relations, which have considerably deteriorated over the last years. The first round of 
NATO's enlargement, discussions on a second one, US plans for a National Missile Defence, 
Russian behaviour at home and in its 'near abroad', the struggle on the Caspian oil and 
                                                 
15  Alexander Matveev, The OSCE Identity Crisis, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the 
University of Hamburg / IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1999, Baden-Baden 2000, p. 63. 
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Kosovo are only some aspects of the larger picture. In this sense, as a rather weak interna-
tional organisation, the OSCE is as much the victim of overall trends as it was their benefici-
ary when the general situation was more relaxed and co-operative. The current situation is 
characterised by a rather high - and with the new US government probably rising - level of US 
assertiveness. As the only world power, the US is used to having its demands met, and in the 
OSCE context it is considerably less ready to compromises than EU Member States. In the 
negotiations of the Vienna Ministerial it might have been possible to find compromises be-
tween the EU Member States and the Russian Federation on some questions (return of the 
OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya, legal capacity of the OSCE, see below) which failed 
because of US unwillingness to compromise. For that reason some Western observers do not 
only speak about 'Russia handling' but also about 'US handling' in the frame of the OSCE. 
 
In spite of conflicting interests, the relations between the Russian Permanent Mission in Vi-
enna and other participating States seem to be rather relaxed and business-like at the moment. 
The level of consultations is generally high, and nobody wants to characterise the situation as 
a "crisis". Nonetheless, as quite often in its previous history, the OSCE once again stands at a 
crossroads. Russia still values the OSCE as the only pan-European frame of co-operation in 
which it can participate on an equal footing. The Russian Federation has not decided to turn 
its back on the OSCE, but it has also not made a definite decision to the contrary. Therefore, if 
Western participating States fail to find enough common political ground to ensure that Rus-
sia is firmly included in the co-operative frame of the OSCE, the situation has the potential to 
develop into a real crisis. OSCE's very raison d'être makes substantial co-operation with Rus-
sia essential. With the exception of the Balkans (where the EU role is steadily increasing), 
cooperation with Russia is crucial for solving problems in all of the crisis areas in the OSCE 
area. Without Russian participation the OSCE would develop into a kind of Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in South Eastern Europe, and render itself superfluous. Thus the 
single most important political question in the OSCE context is how best to integrate the Rus-
sian Federation on a long-term basis. It goes without saying that Russia's willingness and 
ability to co-operate will also be essential. 
 
 
2. The OSCE and the European Union's unfinished CFSP 
 
One question which is almost equally problematic is that of who will be able and willing to 
engage in 'US handling'. The obvious answer is the EU and its Member States. On paper, the 
EU's potential for forging the OSCE according to its own interests is quite impressive. EU 
Member States make up more than a quarter of OSCE participating States, and nearly half if 
one adds candidates for accession and associated states. Additionally, the EU States contrib-
ute about two thirds of the OSCE budget and a comparable share of seconded personnel. Po-
tentially, the EU and its Member States would be well equipped to work as a counterweight to 
the US in matters where US and EU interests are at least moderately divergent. Clearly, in 
reality the situation is quite different, and "there is no doubt that the influence of the United 
States in the OSCE has increased tremendously, especially during the last few years."16 The 
Dutch Ambassador to the OSCE, Landman, points to the fact that it is not the United States 
which is too strong, but the European Union that is too weak: "If the European Union has not 
been able to make its influence stronger felt in Vienna to maintain some equilibrium, despite 
the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, we have only ourselves to blame 
                                                 
16  Ambassador Johannes C. Landman, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the OSCE, An introduc-
tion with some personal thoughts on the OSCE, in: Netherlands Helsinki Committee (Ed.), 25 Years Helsinki 
Final Act, Symposium contributions, The Hague, 9 October 2000, The Hague, p. 11. 
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and should look for remedies in our own camp."17 The relative weakness of the EU States in 
the OSCE has two main sources. First, in spite of the fact that the OSCE was the first training 
ground for the Unions's then new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), there is no 
common policy on many issues. In particular, the three biggest EU States – France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom – have major difficulties in coming to common positions. Second, 
this is aggravated by the fact that some major EU States display considerable uncertainty over 
whether and to what extent they should use the OSCE as an instrument for furthering EU in-
terests. If one takes into account that no group of states benefits more from the activities of 
the OSCE than the enlarging EU, this has a certain ironical quality. US strength and EU 
weakness within the OSCE have lead to "voices in the European Union that tend to draw the 
wrong conclusions from this imbalance. [...] Instead of focusing on reinforcing our capacity to 
act jointly and more effectively in and through the OSCE, they prefer the European Union, 
which after all is developing its own military and civilian rapid reaction capability, to "act on 
its own". Were this scenario to materialize, the OSCE could be easily dispensed with."18 Such 
an approach would represent a serious setback. First, it would represent a defensive reaction 
of the EU in response to its own weakness. Second, it would curtail the strategic outreach of 
today's OSCE crisis prevention and management capabilities. The notion that the EU's basis 
of legitimacy for getting involved in the Caucasus and Central Asia is the same as the one of 
the OSCE is incorrect. Third, it would weaken Euro-Atlantic ties, which are secured not only 
through NATO, but also through the OSCE. And last but by no means least, it would jeop-
ardise the inclusion of Russia in the only existing pan-European co-operation framework. 
 
Ambassador Landman may have been right when he said: "These opinions, fortunately, are 
not yet widely articulated."19 One has to observe, however, that the programmatic statements 
of the EU on non-military crisis management display a certain ambiguity concerning the 
question as to whether the Union should act within the UN and OSCE or autonomously. The 
"Action Plan" of the "Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European 
Union" of the Helsinki European Council on 10 and 11 December 1999 stresses on the one 
hand the aim of "enhancing and facilitating the EU's contributions to, and activities within, 
other organisations," and on the other the "EU autonomous actions"20. As with the Union's 
policy on common military capabilities, this decision aims at the development of capabilities 
without deciding beforehand under what circumstances and in which framework these capa-
bilities should be used. At present, the Union is forging instruments without clearly defining 
objectives. Because the underlying political question about what role the EU will allocate to 
the OSCE remains open, the perspective of this organisation also remains to some extent un-
clear.  
 
It might have been hoped that the High Representative of the European Union for CFSP, 
Javier Solana, could have shed some light on this question when he addressed the PC on 18 
January 2001. Solana's speech, however, was for the most part a repetition of the EU's well-
rehearsed programmatic positions, without developing a political vision as to how the EU 
aims to use the OSCE. The core question as to whether the EU is primarily aiming at working 
within the OSCE or autonomously remains wide open. Solana assured "that close co-opera-
tion between the EU and the OSCE will remain essential" and that the EU is "not aiming to be 
exclusive." On the other hand, he stated that "the increased capacities being developed by the 
                                                 
17  Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
18  Ibid., p. 12 
19  Ibid. 
20  Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, Annex 2 to Annex IV, Presi-
dency Report on Non-Military Management of the European Union, Action Plan, in: 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/hel2_en.htm. 
          
 9
EU are not only for EU-led missions"21, statements which left the question unresolved. Taken 
together, the OSCE - and especially the representation of EU interests within the OSCE - is 
suffering from the contradictions of the EU's unfinished CFSP.  
 
 
3. Ideas on how to Involve the Russian Federation in the OSCE 
 
Shortly after taking office the Romanian Chair slightly changed the format of the PC as well 
as of the Preparatory Committee meetings. PC meetings have been streamlined, i.e. reports of 
HoMs should not take more than five minutes. On the other hand, meetings of the Preparatory 
Committee will now provide a Russian language translation, as demanded by the Russian 
Federation. In addition, on the basis of the above-mentioned Decision No. 7 of the Vienna 
Ministerial, the Chair established a working group on police issues which is chaired by the 
Canadian ambassador Evelyn Puxley. One specific question, progress on which would consid-
erably contribute to the integration of the Russian Federation in the OSCE's work, is the issue 
of 'legal capacity' (see below, chapter 4.1). On the political level one can observe that Roma-
nia was careful not to antagonise Russia unnecessarily. Thus the Romanian Foreign Minister 
Mircea Geoana in his address to the UN Security Council on 29 January 200122 only briefly 
touched upon the problems of Moldova/Transnistria and Georgia, while Chechnya was not 
mentioned at all. Time will show whether this approach of low-profile, discrete diplomacy 
will lead to results, notably whether it can lead to the return of the OSCE Assistance Group to 
Chechnya. 
 
A central problem in the context of working procedures is the transparency and inclusiveness 
of the OSCE decision-making process. Many decisions are made through consultations be-
tween the 'big five' (US, Russia, France, Germany, United Kingdom) only. The fact that 
smaller Western (EU) States do not feel sufficiently represented in the process is clear from a 
Netherlands statement in the PC on the modalities of the establishment of the Rapporteur 
Mission to Belgrade in December 2000:  
 
"2. We deplore the total absence of transparency. [...]. 3. Furthermore, we wish to share 
with other interested members of the Permanent Council our concern about the course this 
Organization is taking. Increasingly we are witnessing a small group of non-elected Rep-
resentatives benefiting from so many privileges of, apparently, a by now structural nature, 
that this is not only weakening the much cherished flexibility with which we wish to pur-
sue our goals; it is also starting to affect this Organization in its core. [...] [T]he essence of 
consensus is the right to participate in the decision making process, and, even more, the 
right to know what is going on. We feel more and more left out of that process."23  
 
Against this background of strong dissatisfaction even amongst Western States, the Romanian 
Chair is making efforts to include more States in the decision-making process. In his first 
speech before the PC the Romanian Foreign Minister said: "we want to develop new ideas for 
strengthening political dialogue between OSCE States; [...] Let's not just talk about coopera-
                                                 
21  Address by Dr. Javier Solana, High Representative of the European Union for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), before the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 18 January 2001, in: http://ue.eu.int/ 
Newsroom/LoadDoc.cfm?...=!!!&BID=107&DID=64626&GRP=3122&LANG=1. 
22  OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Dan Geoana, Address to the United Nations 
Security Council, New York, 29 January 2001, in: http://www.osce.org/cio/speeches/index.php3. 
23  PC.JOUR/313, 7 December 2000, Annex, Statement by the Delegation of the Netherlands, in: 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2000/journals/pcoej313.htm. 
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tion and partnership. [...] Let's see more constructive dialogue leading to action."24 One step in 
this direction is the statement of the PC on 22 February 2001 against violence in Kosovo.25 
 
Another strand of thinking concerns the economic dimension. If the second basket had ever 
had any major importance in the past, one would be tempted to speak of a kind of 'renais-
sance' of this dimension. But of course economic and environmental issues have never been a 
priority but rather the poor cousin of the C/OSCE, so it would be more accurate to speak of 
the emergence of a new trend. The current buzzwords in this field include Caspian Sea, oil, 
water, environmental issues, drug trafficking. The central idea is, as the Chairman-in-Office 
clearly stated, that "we want the OSCE to act as a political catalyst: to identify potential eco-
nomic or environmental trouble spots, and to mobilize states and other national or transna-
tional actors to take the appropriate steps."26 It is difficult to deny the fact that crises and con-
flicts have important economic root causes which have to be tackled if one wants to prevent 
crises and regulate conflicts. On the other hand, the potential of the OSCE for dealing with the 
economic dimension is so limited that there is little to fear in the way of competition with 
other international organisations, including the international financial organisations and the 
EU. Instead, the OSCE could play a complementary role, using its extensive field presence to 
act as an early warning systems for these organisations. Economic issues are linked to certain 
regions, especially the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. At the OSCE Tashkent Conference in 
October 2000 economic and environmental issues already won a new prominence. Also rele-
vant in this respect was the UK's initiation of a Central Asia water project last year.  
 
Another suggestion for enhancing Russian involvement is to concentrate on one of the re-
gional conflicts in order to reach a break-through and to demonstrate that the so-called "frozen 
conflicts" are not insoluble. As appealing as this approach may sound, it would need to over-
come one substantial obstacle: all cases (Moldova/Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Geor-
gia/South Ossetia) lie at the periphery of the Russian Federation and can hardly be solved 
without Russia's co-operation. Thus progress would be dependent on the development of a 
political climate favouring Russian involvement. 
 
In a number of Western Permanent Missions there are also ongoing deliberations on how to 
find appropriate ways of raising 'Western issues' within the OSCE, especially minority and 
human rights issues. Taking into account that two member States of NATO either deny the 
existence of any minorities on their territory (France) or, referring to the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne, recognise only non-Muslim minorities (Turkey), it would be very difficult to make 
progress in this area. Last year, the Turkish government bluntly rejected a demand from the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities for a meeting with the Turkish Foreign 
Minister and Minister for Human Rights.27 The attempt to include the "Lund Recommenda-
tions on Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life"28, authored by a group 
                                                 
24  Address by H.E. Mircea Dan Geoana, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Chairman-in-Office of the 
OSCE, Permanent Council, Vienna, 11 January 2001, in: http://www.osce.org/cio/speeches/index.php3. 
25  Cf. PC.JOUR/322, 22 February 2001, Annex, Statement by the Permanent Council, in: http://www.osce.org/ 
docs/english/pc/2001/journals/pcoej322.htm. 
26  Address by H.E. Mircea Dan Geoana, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, OSCE Chairman-in-Office, 
Heads of OSCE Mission Meeting, Bucuresti, 22 January 2001, in: http://www.osce.org/cio/speeches/ 
index.php3. 
27  Cf. Exchange of letters between the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Ismail Cem, in: Greek Helsinki Monitor / Mi-
nority Rights Group, Greece, Turkey Refuses to Discuss Minority Rights with the OSCE HCNM van der 
Stoel, in: http://www.racoon.riga.lv/minelres/archive/11192000-22:08:59-4934.html. 
28  Lund Recommendations: effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (June 1999), in: 
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/index.htm. 
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of experts under the aegis of the incumbent HCNM, in the Istanbul Summit document, also 
failed. This step would have made these recommendations politically binding on all partici-
pating States. One rare example of raising 'Western issues' was the statement of the Portu-
guese EU Presidency on behalf of the European Union, regarding the "Death Penalty in the 
United States of America"29 on 10 February 2000.  
 
Future developments will demonstrate whether these ideas30 are sufficient to restore the dam-
aged political confidence base of the OSCE. More important than any single measure will be 
the political will of the participating States to stick to the OSCE as the only existing pan-
European framework of co-operation and to use this instrument to strengthen stability and 
security in the OSCE area. 
 
 
4. Problem Areas and Perspectives 
 
 
As discussed above, the Romanian Chairmanship faces a daunting challenge in its attempts to 
steer the OSCE through the current difficult situation following the failed Ministerial Council 
in November 2000. This section focuses on the most important structural and organisational 
matters, as well as the conceptual and regional issues for the OSCE in 2001, and tries to 
evaluate the prospects for finding solutions. Special attention is given to those issues regard-
ing which the Russian Federation has a special interest. 
 
 
4.1  Structural and Organisational Matters 
 
Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities. While the OSCE possesses the characteristics 
necessary to define it as an intergovernmental organization, "[t]he core issue is that the OSCE 
does not enjoy the legal status of an international organization."31 In 1993, the Rome Ministe-
rial Council made a first attempt to rectify this. It decided that the OSCE institutions should 
be granted a legal capacity and privileges and immunities, although not through a treaty in the 
form of an international convention ratified by its participating States, which would have been 
the normal procedure, but under national law subject to the constitutional requirements of 
each participating State. Since then very limited progress has been made, and the results of the 
                                                 
29  PC.JOUR/269, 10 February 2000, Agenda item 2: Review of Current Issues, (b) Death Penalty in the United 
States of America, in. http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2000/journals/pcoej269.htm. 
30  The Netherlands and Germany in a joint initiative presented a number of ideas to strengthen the OSCE in 
spring 2001. 
31  OSCE Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities. Report of the Permanent Council to the Ministerial 
Council, PC.JOUR/383, 26 November 2000, Annex; endorsed by Decision No. 383 of the PC, at: 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2000/decision/pced383.htm. The Report contains as annexes: Secretary 
General's background report on the OSCE Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities (SEC.GAL/20/00 
of 6 March 2000 and SEC.GAL/20/00/Add.1 of 22 March 2000, Attachment 1); Non-paper issued by the 
Austrian Chairmanship on the OSCE Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities (CIO.GAL/42/00 of 23 
June 2000, Attachment 2); Secretary General's paper on difficulties the OSCE has faced or may face due to 
the lack of legal capacity and privileges and immunities granted by all participating States (SEC.GAL/71/00 
of 13 July 2000, Attachment 3); List of Provisions which could be included in a Convention or a Model Bi-
lateral Agreement on the Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities of the OSCE (SEC.GAL/71/00 of 13 
July 2000, Attachment 4); Draft of a Convention on the Legal Capacity of the OSCE and Its Privileges and 
Immunities (CIO.GAL/114/00 of 1 November 2000, Attachment 5); with addendum on Signature and Entry 
into Force (CIO:GAL/114/00/Add.1 of 13 November 2000, Attachment 6); a second Draft of a Convention 
on the Legal Capacity of the OSCE and Its Privileges and Immunities (CIO.GAL/129/00 of 22 November 
2000, Attachment 7); and a Draft Decision of the Ministerial Council on the OSCE Legal Capacity and Its 
Privileges and Immunities (CIO:GAL/130/00 of 1 November 2000, Attachment 8). 
          
 12
open-ended working group of the PC, which was tasked by the Istanbul Summit Declaration32 
of 1999 to prepare recommendations on how to bring the process forward, did not meet the 
necessary consensus for implementation. 
 
The issue of whether it should have a legal personality - defined as an international organisa-
tion's capacity to contract, to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property, and to 
institute and participate in legal proceedings - is not just an academic question for the OSCE. 
It touches on the very self-understanding of this organisation. Although the OSCE has in prin-
ciple shown its ability to act in the absence of a legal capacity, this unresolved issue creates 
some very tangible problems and disadvantages. Thus far, neither the 1993 Rome Council 
decision, implemented only by a few participating States, nor national legislation foresees or 
grants legal capacity to the OSCE as such - i.e. as the entity including all bodies through 
which OSCE mandates are decided and implemented. Instead, they only recognise the Secre-
tariat and the ODIHR as OSCE institutions with such a legal standing. As party to an agree-
ment, the OSCE would have a contractual right to claim that status with all the consequences 
flowing from it; the same could not be said if such status and privileges and immunities were 
based on unilateral action by a State, even if based on a decision by an OSCE organ. This 
situation, and the additional problems associated with the granting of privileges and immuni-
ties to OSCE personnel, causes difficulties for the smooth operation of OSCE institutions and 
missions. OSCE is obliged, f. ex. to conclude Memoranda of Understanding with participating 
States about the deployment of an OSCE Mission, or the protection of local staff against 
criminal prosecution. 
 
Although the Romanian Chairman-in-Office stressed in his priorities for 2001 that the par-
ticipating States "need to assess whether OSCE can function more efficiently with a different 
legal capacity"33, it is very unlikely that we will witness a breakthrough in this respect, be-
cause the OSCE plays a different role for different participating States. While Russia, for ex-
ample, would like to see the OSCE as the lead organisation for European security in order to 
balance the influence of NATO, the United States (and others) want the OSCE to be a flexible 
ad hoc instrument, and fear it would become less controllable were it to develop an institu-
tional life of its own.34 
 
Budget. Another issue of general importance relates to the scale of financial contributions for 
large OSCE Missions.35 In Copenhagen at the 6th Ministerial Council Meeting, December 
1997, the participating States decided to introduce a special scale of financial contributions 
for large OSCE Missions to be valid until 31 December 200036, implying higher costs for the 
richer participating States compared with the normal scale of funding that had already been 
                                                 
32  Point 34 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration of 19 November 1999, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/ 
1990-1999/summits/istadecl99e.htm. 
33  Address by Mircea Dan Geoana, 11 January 2001, cited above (Note 24). 
34  Cf. Anatolii Kvashnin, Main Security challenges: A Military Response, in: International Affairs: A Russian 
Journal, No. 1 (2000), at: https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/iarj/iarj_00_01a.html: "[T]he archi-
tecture of European security, in our opinion, should be based on the OSCE, the only European international 
organization that protects the interests of all its member states."; and the speech of the Deputy Chief of the 
US Mission to the OSCE, Josiah B. Rosenblatt, "OSCE 2001: The Challenges We Face", to the Vienna Dip-
lomatic Academy, Vienna, 23 February 2001, at: http://www.osce.usia.co.at/dip-acad23feb01.html: "Funda-
mentally, the United States views the OSCE as an indispensable instrument for fostering stability, promoting 
prosperity, and developing democratic institutions in Europe. […] As it was in Helsinki more than 25 years 
ago, the OSCE remains a vital forum for political dialogue among its members." (Italics by the author). 
35  Cf. Decision No. 6, 8th OSCE Ministerial, cited above (Note 9). 
36 Cf. Decision on a Scale for Large OSCE Missions and Projects, MC(6).DEC/8, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/ 
english/1990-1999/mcs/6cope97e.htm#Anchor-DECISIO-18138. 
          
 13
decided upon at the Helsinki Summit in 199237. This measure was introduced in response to 
the significant expansion of OSCE's field activities, and the need to maintain these enlarged 
operational capabilities. Due to American opposition during the Vienna Ministerial Council, it 
was not possible to agree upon a new scale. This reflected to a certain degree the tendency of 
the United States towards unilateral action, because all other participating States were ready 
to agree on this issue. 
 
In order not to jeopardize OSCE's ability to act in the field, the participating States agreed in 
December 2000 upon an interim financing agreement to last until the end of March 2001.38 In 
this arrangement and subsequently also in the Unified Budget for 2001 a new element was 
introduced, which foresees "in the budgets for the Large Missions for 2001 a main pro-
gramme amounting to 2.23 per cent of the total to be funded by voluntary contributions."39 
While voluntary contributions are in general not necessarily a bad thing, it is nevertheless a 
first warning signal that the OSCE might gradually be becoming an organisation of interest 
rather than of obligation. In other words, if OSCE action depends more and more on voluntary 
contributions, this would make the influence of the richer participating States even greater 
than it already is now. The existing economic dividing lines in the OSCE area would deepen 
and thus could contribute to the formation of different camps of participating States. 
In the meantime the participating States finally struck a compromise in the form of a new de-
cision on a scale for large OSCE Missions and Projects on 5 April 2001.40 The Interim Finan-
cial Arrangement (PC.DEC/398) will be applied until 31 December 2001. As of 1 January 
2002 the new scale for large Missions will be applied until 31 December 2004. In this scale 
the budgetary voluntary contributions of 2.23 per cent mentioned in the Interim Financial Ar-
rangement are no longer referred to, which means that some participating States have to pay 
more (the most important changes are US 13.57 per cent (compared with 12.40) and Germany 
11.31 per cent (10.34). This means that the distribution of costs for all other OSCE activities 
will still follow the scheme that was agreed upon at the 1992 Helsinki Summit, which is to the 
benefit of States such as the US, the UK, France and Germany, which have to pay only 9.00 
per cent, and to the detriment of inter alia Russia which has to pay 9.00 per cent as well. The 
Permanent Council therefore decided to elaborate a new formula for all OSCE Missions and 
field activities to be effective as of 1 January 2005. This new scale of contributions will be 
based on the following principles: a ceiling of 14.00 per cent and a floor of 0.02 per cent for 
any one participating State, the capacity to pay, a revision of the scale every three years based 
additionally on GNP figures, and on the political nature of the Organisation. This compromise 
thus incorporates the resolve of states like the US not to be drawn into open-ended legally 
binding financial commitments, and the desire of poorer participating States not to be over-
burdened with financial contributions. 
 
OSCE Secretariat. The Secretariat was one of the institutions of the OSCE that went through 
noticeable changes during the course of the year 2000. As a reaction to the poor performance 
of the Organisation during the Kosovo crisis, when it was not possible to deploy enough per-
sonnel on the ground in the necessary time-frame, the participating States decided at the Istan-
bul Summit in 1999 to restructure the Secretariat and to "set up Rapid Expert Assistance and 
Co-operation Teams (REACT) that will [...] enable OSCE bodies and institutions, acting in 
                                                 
37 Cf. XII. Administrative Decisions, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/ 
hels92e.htm#Anchor_ADMINISTRATIV_36615. 
38  Interim Financing Arrangement for the Scale of Contributions for Large OSCE Missions, PC.DEC/398, 14 
December 2000, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2000/decision/pced398.htm. 
39 Year 2001 Unified Budget, PC.DEC/399/Corr., 14 December 2000, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/ 
pc/2000/decision/pced399.htm. 
40  Scale for Large OSCE Missions and Projects (Corrected Reissue), PC.DEC/408/Corr.1, 5 April 2001, at: 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2001/decisions/pced408.htm. 
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accordance with their respective procedures, to offer experts quickly to OSCE participating 
States to provide assistance, in compliance with OSCE norms, in conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation […] [and] to set up an Operation Centre [...] to 
plan and deploy field operations, including those involving REACT resources."41 
 
After one and a half years the balance sheet in this field appears to be fairly positive: the over-
all civilian crisis management capability of the OSCE was strengthened, which can be seen, 
inter alia, through the more transparent recruitment procedures. In this respect, it should be 
noted that REACT is now up and running. The Operation Centre, which serves as a planning 
cell for future missions and field operations, and prepares the deployment of new missions or 
field operations, has stood its first serious test with the deployment of the new OSCE Mission 
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is, however, difficult to generalise outwards from 
this success story, because not all future mission planning and deploying activities are likely 
to take place in such a friendly environment as Yugoslavia after Milosevic, where the estab-
lishment of a mission was welcomed by the authorities, the lines for communication and 
transportation short and the infrastructure more or less in place. Apart from these tasks the 
Operation Centre has the additional function of identifying potential crisis areas. Bearing in 
mind the limited human and other resources and above all the marginal political importance 
of the OSCE Secretariat, which was further reduced by the Romanian Chair's efforts to curtail 
any independent action inside the organisation, one should not expect very much from the 
Operation Centre in this regard. 
 
Another pattern of problems that needs to be tackled relates to the relationship between the 
OSCE Secretariat and the Chairman-in-Office. Every incoming Chairman brings with him or 
her a new set of priorities, working procedures etc. which need to be defined before becoming 
operational. This creates numerous problems and leads to the partial paralysing of the Secre-
tariat, especially in the beginning of a year. Rather than reinventing the wheel every year the 
modalities of co-operation between the Chair and the OSCE Secretariat should instead be 
fixed. This would bring more continuity and stability to the organisation. Last, but not least, it 
should be mentioned that the Secretary General can wear only one hat at the same time. He 
should devote his whole attention to the tasks he has been assigned with, such as the running 
of the Secretariat, and not be tasked with other issues like performing additional functions as 
the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for Central Asia, as was the case dur-
ing the Austrian Chairmanship. 
 
 
4.2 Conceptual Issues 
 
The Human Dimension. As suggested in the first section, Russia has criticised the OSCE for 
putting too much emphasis on the human dimension and in applying double standards by di-
recting its activities in this respect almost exclusively towards Eastern and South Eastern 
Europe. In response, it should first of all be stated unambiguously that there cannot be too 
much emphasis on the human dimension, because it constitutes one of the cornerstones of the 
OSCE. The real problem is that there is not enough emphasis on the politico-military and 
economic and ecological dimensions. A balanced approach towards all three dimensions is a 
prerequisite for comprehensive security. On the other hand there are certain problems and 
                                                 
41  Charter for European Security, Istanbul, November 1999, Point 42. Rapid Response (REACT) and Point 43. 
Operation Centre, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/istachart99e.htm. On 29 June 
2000 the Permanent Council implemented these new structures (Strengthening of OSCE Operational Capaci-
ties (REACT, Operation Centre, Restructuring of the OSCE Secretariat), PC.DEC/364, at: 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2000/decision/pced364.htm). 
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limitations of the OSCE's human dimension as such and in relation to its geographical out-
reach, substance and institutional framing.42 
 
Regarding the geographical outreach of the human dimension, it is true that the OSCE is al-
most exclusively active in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus and South Eastern 
Europe, thus neglecting for instance Turkey and the Kurdish question, not to mention existing 
human rights problems in 'Western' countries. But there are also certain 'double standards' for 
the 'Eastern' countries, since the OSCE participating States raise concerns about the human 
rights situation in the Russian Federation only selectively, while smaller and weaker partici-
pating States like the Central Asian States or Belarus are permanently 'bashed' in this regard. 
The human dimension of the OSCE is traditionally a predominantly Western driven issue. It is 
therefore not surprising that positive developments regarding the implementation of OSCE 
commitments in the human dimension can be observed especially in those regions where 
'sticks' can be combined with 'carrots' (prospects for integration in 'hard' economic and mili-
tary security structures like the EU and NATO), like in Eastern Central Europe, the Baltic 
States and to a certain degree in South Eastern Europe.43 
 
The question remains that of how to find a more balanced approach for the whole OSCE re-
gion. A watering down of commitments through simply adding new projects and initiatives in 
'Western' countries just to achieve a balance is equally out of the question. This would over-
stretch the already limited capacities of the organisation. What should be reconsidered, how-
ever, is the issue of the substance of OSCE activities in the human dimension. Since 1990 
when the normative basis of OSCE commitments in the human dimension was forged, the 
organisation has witnessed a tremendous expansion of tasks44 without a corresponding expan-
sion in its financial means and institutional structures. The OSCE can not rely on a set of le-
gally binding instruments like the Council of Europe, and does not have the capacity to act as 
a development agency like the UN or EU. Therefore it should focus on those human dimen-
sion issues that have the potential to affect the overall security situation, and not lose focus by 
dealing with too many issues at the same time. It goes without saying that gender issues and 
the development of universities (for example in Belarus), just to mention some examples, are 
important issues as such and can sometimes serve as 'door-openers' for other issues. But the 
OSCE should try to tackle in the first instance those issues in the human dimension that are 
likely to affect the overall security situation in the OSCE region, or which contribute directly 
to the process of conflict resolution. Regarding the first, the OSCE should give more promi-
nence to the question of freedom of movement, because we are already witnessing the first 
signs of the establishment of a new 'iron curtain' between countries that are or soon will be-
come members of the EU, and those to the East which will remain outside at least in the near 
future. Regarding the second, civic diplomacy could and should play a much more significant 
                                                 
42  Cf. also Randolf Oberschmidt, 25 Jahre menschliche Dimension der KSZE/OSZE. Von der Schlussakte von 
Helsinki (1975) zum Istanbuler Gipfel, in: S + F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden, Jg. 18, H. 4 
(2000), pp. 319-327. 
43  This can be observed for instance when evaluating the activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on Na-
tional Minorities (HCNM) in Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania. During 2001 CORE will start publish-
ing research studies on the activities of the HCNM in Estonia, Latvia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Ma-
cedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. For the structure of the study see: Wolfgang Zellner, On the Effec-
tiveness of the OSCE Minority Regime. Comparative Case Studies on Implementation of the Recommenda-
tions of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE, Hamburg 1999 (Hamburger Beiträge 
zu Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, No. 111), at: http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/core-
ifsh/Publications/On%20the%20Effectivness%20of%20the%20OSCE%20Minority%20Regime.pdf. 
44  Cf. for instance the numerous projects and activities for 2001 of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR), at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/cal2000.htm#d1. 
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role for the OSCE in the so-called 'frozen conflicts' (Abkhazia, South-Ossetia, Transnistria, 
Nagorno-Karabakh). 
 
The Politico-Military Dimension. Under Annex 1-B of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords the 
OSCE is mandated to assist in negotiating and implementing three different arms control 
agreements: one on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Art. II, concluded on 26 January 
1996), an agreement on subregional arms control covering Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
and the FRY (Art. IV, concluded on 14 June 1996) as well as an agreement on arms control 
"in and around the former Yugoslavia" (Art. V).45 Art. V negotiations which had been started 
on 8 March 1999 were initially impeded by the Kosovo war, which prompted FRY to leave 
the negotiations, and subsequently from the suspension of the FRY from the OSCE. Only the 
re-admission of the FRY to the OSCE on 10 November 2000 cleared the way for meaningful 
negotiations, enabling the 8th Ministerial to call upon the negotiating States to conclude their 
work "no later than by the next meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council."46 
 
Although only 30 of the 55 participating States are States Parties to the Treaty on Conven-
tional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) this agreement is an indispensable element for 
maintaining stability and security in the OSCE area. Since the signing of the "Agreement on 
Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" and the "Final Act of the 
Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" at 
the Istanbul Summit on 19 November 199947 only two States (Belarus and Ukraine) have 
started the ratification procedure, and the government of the Russian Federation has an-
nounced that it will join them in the near future. The most important reason for this consider-
able delay in the ratification process lies in the fact that the Russian Federation as yet fails to 
comply with three conditions enshrined in the Final Act and in the Istanbul Summit Declara-
tion. First, the Russian Federation on 1 November 1999 committed itself to all obligations 
under the Treaty and, in particular, "to agreed levels of armaments and equipment"48. This 
also includes the flank ceiling the Russian Federation has not yet complied with because of 
the Chechen crisis. Second, the Russian Federation committed itself "to complete withdrawal 
of the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002."49 Third, the Russian 
Federation and Georgia agreed that the Russian side reduce by 31 December 2000 its treaty-
limited equipment in Georgia to 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery systems, and that it 
disband by 1 July 2001 its military bases at Gudauta and Vaziani. Finally, the two sides com-
mitted themselves to "complete negotiations regarding the duration and modalities of the 
functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki"50 in the course of the 
year 2000. While the first commitment was kept and the second issue can also probably be 
addressed, the positions in the third one are still far apart: Georgia is demanding the disband-
ment of Batumi and Akhalkalaki by 2003, whereas the Russian Federation wants to keep 
these two bases for 15 years. Taken together, complicated problems touching the core politi-
cal issues of the respective crises have to be solved before the ratification process of the CFE 
adaptation can build up steam. From this perspective, there is a risk that European arms con-
trol will become the hostage of unresolved subregional problems.  
 
                                                 
45  Cf. OSCE Handbook Online, 9. Military Aspects of Security, Regional arms control agreements - Articles II, 
IV and V of the Dayton Peace Accords, at: http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/9.htm#4. 
46  Vienna Declaration on the Role of the OSCE in South-Eastern Europe, cited above (Note 4). 
47  CFE.DOC/1/99, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/cfe/cfeagree.pdf; and CFE.DOC/2/99, at:  
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/cfe/cfefinact99e.pdf. 
48  Final Act, ibid. 
49 Point 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration, cited above (Note 32). 
50  Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and Georgia, Istanbul, 17 November 1999, Annex 14 of the Final 
Act, CFE.DOC/2/99, cited above (Note 47). 
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It is obvious that the recent discussions about NATO enlargement and the US National Mis-
sile Defence have led to noticeable irritations between the US and its European allies and 
even more between the US and Russia. While it remains unclear whether we will witness a 
general deterioration of relationships, it is clear that arms control and the OSCE as such are 
hostages to these future developments. But this is not the only reason why the politico-mili-
tary dimension of the OSCE needs new paradigms. Recent efforts to curtail the uncontrolled 
proliferation of small arms and weapons and regional confidence- and security-building meas-
ures seem to be taking the right direction. Generally speaking, there must be more emphasis 
on the potential role of the military dimension in conflict and crisis prevention, and more ef-
forts towards comprehensive security by integrating this dimension into the human and eco-
nomic dimensions. One step concerning the first aspect is the OSCE Document on Small 
Arms and Light Weapons of 24 November 2000, which aims at curtailing the uncontrolled 
spread of these weapons.51 
 
Peace-keeping and Executive Policing. These two special issues, which also belong to the 
politico-military dimension, came again to the surface of principle OSCE activities in 1999 at 
the Istanbul Summit. There, the participating States decided "to explore options for a poten-
tially greater and wider role for the OSCE in peacekeeping. […]. [T]he OSCE can, on a case-
by-case basis and by consensus, decide to play a role in peacekeeping, including a leading 
role […] [or] provide the mandate covering peacekeeping by others and seek the support of 
participating States as well as other organizations to provide resources and expertise."52  
 
The OSCE as a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is principally 
entitled to conduct peace-keeping operations, but not peace-enforcement, which must be 
mandated by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. But is the OSCE 
ready for such a role? Apart from planning for a future peace-keeping operation after a still 
very uncertain settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict53, and a Russian initiative to give 
the Russian peace-keeping forces in Trans-Dniestr an OSCE mandate54, the issue of peace-
keeping has a relatively low profile for the OSCE. So far, the Organisation has only been able 
to handle small military monitoring missions. If it were to prepare for real peace-keeping op-
erations, more planning capacities in the OSCE Secretariat would have to be created and this 
would need to start prior to the signing of any agreement. If an operation were deployed 
shortly after a settlement, any delay could jeopardise the peace process. A standing organ 
must be instituted, which would be prepared to assist the Chairman-in-Office in leading an 
operation at any given moment.  
 
The most crucial issue to address would be the question as to which military contingents 
should be used. It is virtually unthinkable that Russia would consent to any peace-keeping 
operation on the territory of the former Soviet Union without the participation of their contin-
                                                 
51  FSC.DOC/1/00, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/fsc/2000/decis ions/fscew231.pdf. 
52  Point 46 of the Charter for European Security, cited above (Note 41). 
53  In the framework of the OSCE the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is dealt with by the so-called Minsk Process, a 
Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Confer-
ence, and a High Level Planning Group, which has elaborated several options for deploying peace-keepers 
after a settlement of the conflict. Cf. OSCE Secretariat. Conflict Prevention Centre, Survey of OSCE Long-
Term Missions and Other OSCE Field Activities, 17 January 2000, at: http://www.osce.org/publications/ sur-
vey/survey.pdf. 
54  The so-called Primakov plan of summer 2000 suggested new elements to the solution of the Trans-Dniestr 
issue, and especially for the time after the settlement, that "the peacekeeping contingent should include 
OSCE international observers, while the contingent's backbone should be peacekeepers from Russia and 
Ukraine." (Moldovan Press Publishes Primakov's Draft Agreement on Transnistria, Infotag, 6 September 
2000, at: http://news.ournet.md/2000/09/06/en/1.html). 
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gents in this operation. In practice, only a combination of Western and Russian units would be 
a viable option, because neither Russia nor Western States such as the US would be accepted 
as the sole contributors by the conflicting parties. 
 
Concerning policing the OSCE has already gathered some experience in recent years, for in-
stance through a monitoring operation in the Danube region of Croatia55, and in setting up a 
Police Service School under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo.56 The 
OSCE has refrained so far from executive policing, although the participating States stated in 
Istanbul, that they "will examine options and conditions for a role in law enforcement."57 
Nevertheless, during the Vienna Ministerial Council agreement was only reached "to study 
the possible establishment of a new post of Police Adviser […] within the Secretariat."58 
Since January 2001 an informal working group on police-related activities, which is chaired 
by Canada, discusses this issue.59  
 
Recent experience in Kosovo has demonstrated that the military is not suited for tasks related 
to the maintenance of law and order. What is needed is a well-trained local police force, 
which could bridge the gap between military security and public order. Before this force is in 
place an international civilian police force will have to take over these responsibilities, in-
cluding the right to law enforcement if necessary. While the US is inclined to go beyond 
monitoring and training60, reluctance has been shown especially from the delegation of the 
United Kingdom, so that no breakthrough can be expected in this matter. 
 
The Economic and Environmental Dimension. The Economic Dimension has traditionally 
been the 'Cinderella' of the OSCE. Although it has a prominent place in the Helsinki Final Act 
in 197561, where economic issues constituted the so-called Basket II, further developments 
have illustrated that the OSCE is not an economic organization. Nonetheless, as part of its 
comprehensive approach to security, it should be concerned with economic and environ-
mental issues as a means of contributing to peace, prosperity and stability. With the aim of re-
inforcing this approach, the OSCE Permanent Council established the position of Co-ordina-
tor of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities within the OSCE Secretariat on 5 No-
vember 1997, with the most important part of his mandate to enhance the OSCE's interaction 
with relevant international organizations; to strengthen the economic, environmental, and so-
cial components in the work of OSCE missions and field activities; and to formulate a pro-
gramme of work for appropriate additional activities in, and relating to the OSCE's economic 
dimension.62 
 
In 2000 the work of the Co-ordinator's Office, which has only very limited financial means 
and personnel at its disposal, was mainly directed towards the training of Economic and Envi-
ronmental Officers in the Field Missions and the organising of seminars on economic and en-
                                                 
55 Cf. PC.DEC/373, 21 September 2000, The Police Monitoring Group in Croatia, at: http://www.osce.org/ 
docs/english/pc/2000/decision/pced373.htm. 
56 Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Factsheet: Kosovo Police Service School, at: http://www.osce.org/ 
kosovo/police/pdf/kps_factsheet-eng.PDF. 
57 Point 44 of the Charter for European Security, cited above (Note 41). 
58 Decision No. 7, 8th OSCE Ministerial, cited above (Note 9). 
59 Cf. PC.JOUR/316, 18 January 2001, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2001/journals/pcoej316.htm. 
60  Cf. the speech of Josiah B. Rosenblatt: "We expect to examine the OSCE's role in policing beyond its moni-
toring experience in Croatia and the widely acclaimed Kosovo Police School." (Cited above [Note 34]). 
61  In Helsinki the participating States were convinced, "that their efforts to develop cooperation in the fields of 
trade, industry, science and technology, the environment and other areas of economic activity contribute to 
the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole". (Helsinki Final Act, 1 
August 1975, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/helfa75e.htm# Anchor-6209). 
62  Cf. PC.DEC/194, 5 November 1997, at: http://www.osce.org/eea/PCED194.pdf, as of 1 April 2001. 
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vironmental issues, especially in Central Asia.63 Another task of the Co-ordinator is to coordi-
nate the Economic Fora, which are held once a year to strengthen the focus of the OSCE on 
the transition to and development of free-market economies.64 The priorities for 2001 remain 
in principle the same.65 
 
When considering the possible added value of the OSCE's activities in the economic and envi-
ronmental dimensions one can conclude that the Organisation has not yet developed the nec-
essary operational approach. Seminars and meetings are a good way to promote awareness of 
these dimensions and their possible impact on security, and to streamline this into the field 
activities of the OSCE, but we are still far from witnessing a real difference on the ground. If 
one were to take the high demands of the Helsinki Final Act seriously, the OSCE would have 
to tackle those issues that really affect comprehensive security in the OSCE region, such as 
the oil- and pipeline-issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus or the deepening economic divi-
sions between East and West. But these issues are far too big for the OSCE, or, put bluntly, 
national interests are at stake that prevent some participating States from putting these ques-
tions on the OSCE agenda. 
 
 
4.3 Regional Issues 
 
OSCE Missions and other OSCE field activities constitute the backbone of the Organisation. 
It is precisely in this area that the OSCE is most visible and where it tries to make a difference 
on the ground. This sub-section therefore deals with the most important tasks for the OSCE in 
2001 in this regard, and with the prospects of contributing to a solution of the existing prob-
lems and conflicts, taking into account in particular Russia's position. 
 
Regional Strategies. A number of frustrating experiences in South Eastern Europe led the 
Head of Mission of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ambassador Barry (US), 
to launch a new initiative. These experiences included the rather mixed success of various 
OSCE Missions in fulfilling their country-specific mandates in the field of post conflict reha-
bilitation and democracy building, and problems of 'the wheel being reinvented' several times 
because one Mission was not aware of what the OSCE Mission in the neighbouring country 
was doing. Barry's initiative aimed to tackle patterns of problems that were occurring 
throughout South Eastern Europe, through a regional perspective that co-ordinated the activi-
ties of the OSCE, and thus avoided any duplication of efforts. 
 
On 16 March 2000 the Permanent Council adopted a Regional Strategy for South Eastern 
Europe which included the following goals: "To develop a comprehensive and interdimen-
sional policy on region-wide and cross-border issues in South Eastern Europe; To extend in-
dividual OSCE field operations' expertise and resources to other existing OSCE field opera-
tions in the region […][and]; To increase close co-operation with other international organi-
                                                 
63  Cf. OSCE Newsletter, Vol. VII, No. 11 (November 2000), Permanent Council turns spotlight on the eco-
nomic dimension of the OSCE, at: http://www.osce.org/publications/newsletter/2000-11/nl112000_9a.htm. 
64  The 8th Meeting of the Economic Forum, which took place in Prague 11-14 April 2000, dealt with "Economic 
Aspects of Post-conflict Rehabilitation: The Challenges of Transformation" (cf. EF.GAL/11/00, 8 May 2000, 
at: http://www.osce.org/eea/forum/forum8/efgal011.pdf). The 9th Meeting will take place 15-18 May 2001 
and deals with "Transparency and Good Governance in Economic Matters" (cf. PC.DEC/404, 1 March 2001, 
at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2001/decisions/pced404.htm). 
65  The Romanian Chairman-in-Office gave only a very vague outline for 2001: "We will consider ways to 
strengthen the OSCE's ability to address economic and environmental issues and to further refine the OSCE's 
tasks in the areas like good governance and transparency." (Address by Mircea Dan Geoana, 11 January 
2001, cited above [Note 24]). 
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zations […] for avoidance of duplication of tasks and a focus on the added value each organi-
zation can provide".66 One year after the adoption of this strategy, which at the time was her-
alded as a new conceptual approach for the OSCE (some see it over-optimistically already as 
the 4th dimension of a comprehensive security architecture), little is now heard about it.67 The 
reason for this is simply that the EU driven Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is the real 
centre for the regional efforts of the international community, and the OSCE plays only a 
rather marginal role in the concrete activities, concentrating mainly on the Task Force on 
Gender under Working Table I (Democratisation) and the Task Force on Trafficking in Hu-
man Beings under Working Table III (Security Issues), where ODIHR is the lead agency. 
 
The conception of a regional approach for South Eastern Europe is widely acknowledged. 
Nevertheless, structural problems remain, which are to a certain extent problems for the 
OSCE as well, since the Stability Pact was placed under the auspices of the OSCE. First of 
all, some countries such as Slovenia and Croatia have the feeling that they are being pressed 
into a region to which they do not want to belong, and which was rather forged from outside. 
Second, not all countries are on the same level in terms of economics, civil society etc. And, 
third, some issues of regional importance are not handled with a sufficient degree of reciproc-
ity, such as the return of refugees or co-operation with ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia). 
 
Another area where the OSCE has already come close to developing a kind of regional strat-
egy is Central Asia. In 1998 at the Oslo Ministerial Council the participating States decided to 
explore possibilities for a more co-ordinated approach to Central Asia.68 Ambassador Höynck, 
the then Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for Central Asia, prepared a re-
port that was discussed in the PC in September 1999.69 A comprehensive approach by the 
OSCE towards this region and regional co-operation among the Central Asian States were 
again addressed during the Istanbul Summit70, and in 2000 the Secretary General Kubiš, also 
acting as the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office for Central Asia, continued 
to travel extensively in the region and to promote co-ordination efforts between international 
organisations. In particular, efforts to tackle the security challenges for the Central Asian 
                                                 
66 Regional Strategy for South Eastern Europe, PC.DEC/344, 16 March 2000, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/ 
english/pc/2000/decision/pced344.htm. 
67  At the Vienna Ministerial the participating States at least adopted a declaration in this regard: "6. We stress 
the importance of regional co-operation as a means to foster good neighbourly relations, stability and eco-
nomic development. We will continue to work together towards this goal. […] We note the decision of the 
Permanent Council on the adoption of the OSCE Regional Strategy for South Eastern Europe." (Vienna 
Declaration on the Role of the OSCE in South Eastern Europe, 28 November 2000, cited above [Note 4]). In 
the priorities of the Romanian Chair it simply says: "Increased intra-regional cooperation is important for the 
consolidation of political and economic stability in the region." (Address by Mircea Dan Geoana, 11 January 
2001, cited above [Note 24]). On another occasion Geoana emphasised before Heads of OSCE Missions: 
"[W]e need to look at our activity from a regional perspective. […] So I would ask you to look carefully at 
the regional context in which your mission operates. I want to develop a consistent practice of regular re-
gional meetings." (Address by Mircea Dan Geoana, 22 January 2001, cite above [Note 26, stress in the origi-
nal]). 
68  Cf. Decision on Central Asia, MC(7).DEC/7, 3 December 1998, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-
1999/mcs/7oslo98e.htm#Anchor-DECISIO-63283. 
69  Cf. Annual Report 1999 of the Secretary General on OSCE Activities (1 December 1998 - 31 October 1999), 
1.3.2 Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on Central Asia, SEC.DOC/2/99, 17 Novemb er 
1999, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrep99e.htm#1,3,2. 
70  Cf. Istanbul Summit Declaration, 19 November 1999, Points 13. and 14.: "[…] With the continuing support 
of our partners in Central Asia, the OSCE has now established offices in all five States. This in particular has 
contributed to an expansion of our co-operative activities in all OSCE dimensions. […] We are convinced 
that strengthening regional co-operation will promote stability and security in Central Asia, and we welcome 
the active approach taken by the Chairman-in-Office to this effect." (Cited above [Note 32]).  
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States caused by international terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime and drug and 
arms trafficking, dominated the agenda for 2000.71 Since the Vienna Ministerial, which for 
the above-mentioned reasons could not produce a common declaration72, the OSCE has thus 
far been unable to develop a regional strategy for Central Asia, although some attempts have 
been made - such as the UK proposal to bring the Central Asian states together to develop a 
regional system of water management, although this met with a lukewarm response in the 
region. 
 
The reasons for this are manifold. First of all, the Central Asian States are still in the process 
of overcoming the Soviet legacy of enforced co-operation and therefore have little inclination 
to work in concert again. Secondly, a regional approach towards Central Asia is perceived by 
the states in that region as something forced upon them from the outside, while they are more 
keen to emphasise the differences that exist between them. And thirdly, but not least, one can 
observe a relatively stronger interest for regional co-operation on part of the Central Asian 
states in the economic and security dimensions, where the OSCE has less to offer than, for 
example, Russia. 
 
A third region in which a regional strategy or approach for the OSCE is under consideration is 
the Caucasus, although very little if any concrete steps in this direction have been taken so 
far. In 2000, under the Austrian Chairmanship, a Personal Representative of the Chairperson-
in-Office for the Caucasus tried to pave the way for a regional approach. But structural prob-
lems prevented a major breakthrough. One reason can be found in the fact that the mandate 
for the Personal Representative, Ambassador Tagliavini from Switzerland, was rather unclear. 
She had to deal with Georgia, where an OSCE Mission was already on the ground, and with 
Chechnya. Another reason is that the Caucasus exists more in terms of physical geography 
than politically. Developing a regional approach for the Caucasus would mean also dealing 
with the northern part of the region, which belongs to the Russian Federation. It would there-
fore be more advisable for the OSCE to think about a strategy for the Southern Caucasus, that 
is Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In this regard there are similar problems to those in 
South Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which make a regional approach for the states con-
cerned difficult to accept. Nonetheless, the OSCE could very well develop a comprehensive 
                                                 
71  Cf. Annual Report 2000 of the Secretary General on OSCE Activities (1 November 1999 - 31 October 2000), 
3.2 The Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office for Central Asia, SEC.DOC/5/00, 24 Novem-
ber 2000, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrep00e_activ.htm#Anchor-3.-8453. On 19 and 20 
October 2000 in Tashkent a joint OSCE/UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention International 
Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia: "An Integrated Approach to Counter Drugs, 
Organized Crime and Terrorism" took place. The draft Tashkent Declaration of 27 September tried to com-
bine the need for security and stability without loosing sight of commitments in the human dimension: "We 
[the participants of the conference] […] 13. Declare our willingness to deepen our co-operation to enhance 
security and stability in Central Asia by following a common approach to countering drugs, organised crime 
and terrorism; [and] 10. Reaffirm the principle of comprehensive security of the OSCE, one part of which is 
the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law. We commit our-
selves to counter threats to security without violating human rights and fundamental freedoms, including not 
creating any obstacles for the free movement of people". (At: http://www.osce.org/calo/docs/tashkent-2.pdf 
[stress in the original]). The discussion on these issues was taken up again during the OSCE-Japan Confer-
ence 2000: "Comprehensive Security in Central Asia – Sharing OSCE and Asian Experiences", Tokyo, 11-12 
December 2000 (Consolidated Summary at: http://www.osce.org/external_co-operation/seminars/ 
osce_seminars/japan2000.pdf). 
72  Only the Chair mentioned in her own statement Central Asia: "Ministers noted with satisfaction that the en-
gagement of the OSCE towards co-operation with the five participating States of Central Asia had continued 
to grow in all dimensions. Based on its comprehensive, three-dimensional approach to security the OSCE 
should find effective ways to respond to the new challenges to security and stability in Central Asia in co-op-
eration with other international institutions and on the basis of the Platform for Co-operative Security." 
(Statement of the Chairperson-in-Office, 28 November 2000, cited above [Note 1]). 
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and inter-dimensional policy on region-wide and cross-border issues, which could comple-
ment, but not substitute, the already existing activities of the Organisation in the respective 
countries.73 
 
South Eastern Europe. In South Eastern Europe the OSCE is active with field activities in 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in 
Kosovo as part of the UNMIK structure, and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia proper 
with an office in Belgrade. Although there remains much to be done by the OSCE in each of 
its field activities in this region74, the focus is most certainly on Kosovo, Macedonia and the 
newly established OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 
In Kosovo, where the OSCE has more than 2,100 staff on the ground, the Mission will con-
centrate in 2001 on the ongoing building of democratic institutions and preparations for gen-
eral elections.75 In Kosovo the international community, including OSCE, is increasingly con-
fronted with dilemmas related to a basic problem: Kosovo is more than ever divided along 
ethnic lines, and the minorities (mainly Serbs and Roma) are subject to ethnically motivated 
violence and crime.76 What is even more destabilising is the still undecided question as to 
what status Kosovo should receive. While the majority of Albanian Kosovars do not want to 
accept anything less than full independence from Yugoslavia, the international community is 
defending the principle of territorial integrity because it fears creating a precedent with un-
controllable consequences. In such a situation international organisations on the ground are 
more and more perceived as the new enemy and are in danger of becoming the target of ter-
rorist groups.77 The unsolved issue of Kosovo is also the main reason behind new critical de-
velopments in the bordering regions, affecting Macedonia and Yugoslavia. 
                                                 
73  Cf. Randolf Oberschmidt, Georgia and Stability for the South Caucasus: An OSCE Perspective (forthcom-
ing). See also Presentation by H. E. Márton Krasznai, Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre of the 
OSCE, The future role of OSCE in resolving conflicts and fostering co-operation in the Caucasus region, 
Yerevan, 27-28 September 2000, at: http://www.osce.org/yerevan/docs/speech-cpc-2000.pdf. 
74  In Albania as priorities remain: Ensuring properly organised, timely and well-run parliamentary elections; 
enhancing the fight against organised crime, trafficking and smuggling in human beings; strengthening the 
rule of law and furthering the fight against corruption. (See 5th International Conference of Friends of Alba-
nia Group, 2 March 2001, Conclusions, at: http://www.osce.org/albania/foa/pdf/foa_march2001_concl.PDF). 
In Croatia the most burning issues for 2001 are: Progress in the area of return and integration of the Serb 
community; nation-wide local elections on 20 May; and the question how to reduce the number of personnel 
of the Mission. (See Statement by Ambassador Bernard Poncet, Head of the OSCE Mission to Croatia, to the 
Permanent Council, 22 March 2001, at: http://www.osce.org/croatia/hom_statement_pc_220301.pdf). In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the OSCE Mission is part of the structure established after the Dayton Peace 
Agreement under the leadership of the Office of the High Representative, the international community is still 
struggling with very slow progress in order to build a multi-ethnic society. Recent threats made by the Croa-
tian National Congress in Bosnia and Herzegovina to boycott the federal structures show how fragile the con-
structed statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina is. (See OSCE Responds to Croat National Congress Declara-
tion, Sarajevo, 4 April 2001, at: http://www.oscebih.org/pressreleases/march2001/04-03-cnc.htm; and Ad-
dress by High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), New 
York, 22 March 2001, at: http://www.ohr.int/speeches/s20010322a.htm). In Montengro, activities concentrate 
on democratisation programmes and election observation of the 22 April parliamentary elections. (See 
OSCE/ODIHR sends observers to monitor parliamentary elections in Montenegro, ODIHR Press Release, 28 
March 2001, at: http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id=1574). 
75  See Head of Mission in Kosovo outlines priorities for 2001, OMIK Press Release, 11 January 2001, at: 
http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id=1401. 
76  See UNHCR/OSCE Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (period covering October 
2000 through February 2001), 26 March 2001, at: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/pdf/ 
minrep0301.pdf. 
77  A first incident happened in January 2001, when OSCE personnel was attacked in Mitrovice/Kosovska Mi-
trovica. (See Chairman-in-Office condemns brutal attack on OSCE personnel in Kosovo, Press Release, 30 
January 2001, at: http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id=1430). 
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In Yugoslavia hopes ran high after the election of Kostunica and the ousting of Milosevic. The 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reintegrated into the OSCE and on 16 March 2001 an 
OSCE Mission commenced its activities in Belgrade with the mandate of assisting the Yugo-
slav authorities in their democratisation efforts.78 In this context, the international community 
was, nota bene, also becoming less and less enthusiastic in supporting Montenegro in its ef-
forts to become more independent from Serbia. At the beginning of 2001 the situation in the 
border regions of South Serbia with Kosovo was aggravated when fighters of the so-called 
Albanian Liberation Army Preševo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB) started to attack 
Serbian police in this region, where the Albanian population constitutes a majority in some 
areas. Meanwhile KFOR, which has the task of controlling the Ground Safety Zone around 
Kosovo, has allowed the Yugoslav Army to return to 3 of the 5 sectors and has itself at-
tempted to tighten control in the border region.79 Violence has also spread to Macedonia, 
where fighting between Albanian military formations and Macedonian security forces around 
Tetovo which started in mid-March has brought the country to the brink of civil war.80 
 
What can the OSCE do? It is clear that the Organisation can not ensure 'hard' security, which 
is for the responsibility of KFOR. On the other hand, OSCE must try to prevent the conflicts 
from becoming even more destabilising. First steps into this direction were the decision to 
temporarily double the international personnel strength of the OSCE Mission to Skopje from 
8 to 16, and the appointment of the Balkan expert Ambassador Robert H. Frowick as Personal 
Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.81 It seems clear that the OSCE can contribute to a lasting stabilisation only in 
close co-operation with other organisations and states, also taking into account Russia's posi-
tion. 
 
Russia's policy towards South Eastern Europe is not surprising given the experience of the 
Kosovo crisis, when US-led NATO demonstrated that Russia had no veto over its military 
action. The consequences of NATO's air campaign, which was perceived by Russia as a "final 
humiliation and a "spit in the face""82, can be felt in the global political climate between East 
and West but is also relevant in the framework of OSCE. In order to safeguard its strategic 
goals in this region (access to the Mediterranean, keeping Yugoslavia as a potential ally, abil-
ity to block NATO expansion)83, Russia is relying on its military contingents in SFOR and 
                                                 
78  On 10 November 2000 the Permanent Council welcomed Yugoslavia officially as participating State 
(PC.DEC/380, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2000/decision/pced380.htm). On 11 January 2001 
followed the decision about the OSCE Mission (PC.DEC/401, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2001/ 
decisions/pced401.htm). 
79  See Matthias Rüb, Die serbische Regierung gibt sich kompromissbereit, die Albaner radikalisieren sich. Die 
Spannungen in Südserbien wachsen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 February 2001, p. 3; Patrick Moore, 
NATO Cautious on Presevo Security Zone, RFE/RL Balkan Report, 2 March 2001, Volume 5, Number 17, 
at: http://www.rferl.org/balkan-report/2001/03/17-020301.html; Historical meeting at the boundary, KFOR 
News Reports, 30 March 2001, at: http://www.kforonline.com/news/reports/nr_30mar01.htm. 
80  See for instance Patrick Moore, Questions from Tetovo, RFE/RL Balkan Report, 16 March 2001, Volume 5, 
Number 20, at: http://www.rferl.org/balkan-report/2001/03/20-160301.html; and The Macedonian Question: 
Reform or Rebellion (ICG Balkan Report 109, 5 April 2001), at: http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/ 
macedonia/reports/A400268_05042001.pdf. 
81  Temporary Strengthening of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, PC.DEC/405, 22 March 2001, 
at: http://www.osce.org/skopje/docs/pcdec405.pdf; Robert Frowick OSCE representative on situation in for-
mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Chairman-in-Office Press Release, 21 March 2001, at: 
http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id=1557. 
82  Alexei G. Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and 
Chechnya, Garmisch-Partenkirchen 2000 (The Marshall Center Papers, 2), at: http://www.marshallcenter.org/ 
CISS/MCPaperstwo.pdf. 
83  On Russian Strategy in South Eastern Europe see f. ex.: Pavel Kandel', Balkanskie interesy Rossii: podlinnye 
i mnimye [Russia's interests in the Balkans: the real and the temporary ones], in: Rossija na Balkanach [Rus-
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KFOR as a safeguard against possible unwelcome changes of the geo-strategic situation in 
this region, rather than occupying itself with the economic and democratic development of the 
region and the countries there respectively. The OSCE, in which Russia has a right of veto, is 
seen as an instrument for preventing the further destabilisation of the region, which would not 
be in her interest.84 
 
Caucasus. The priorities for the OSCE in 2001 in this region are: the return of the OSCE As-
sistance Group to Chechnya, progress in the issues of the 'frozen conflicts' in Abkhazia, 
Southern Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the stabilisation of Georgia, including the full 
implementation of the Istanbul decisions regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops.85 In 
addition, the Organisation is busy with the human dimension activities of the OSCE field ac-
tivities in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and of the ODIHR.86 
 
The issues of concern to the OSCE in this region affect the interests of Russia even more di-
rectly than in South Eastern Europe. Any major breakthrough will therefore depend on 
whether this will be seen by Russia as consistent with its strategic objectives, which are in 
essence: no support for Chechen 'terrorists' or the independence of Chechnya; no strength-
ening of NATO's position in the region; no isolation of Russia from the region's vital affairs; 
no isolation of Russia from the energy and communication sector linking the region with the 
outside world; and no strengthening of the positions of the US, Turkey and EU countries to 
the detriment of Russian interests.87 This being said, a realistic assessment of OSCE's chances 
for conflict resolution in the region is necessary in order to avoid creating disproportionate 
expectations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
sia in the Balkans], Moskva 1996 (Naucnye doklady/Moskovskij Centr Karnegi, vyp. 8), at: 
http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1999/05dt/default.asp?n=toc.asp; Wolf Oschlies, Russische Balkanpolitik: 
Mythos in realpolitischer Bewährung? (Bericht des BIOst Nr. 19/2000 [31. Juli 2000] and Nr. 30/2000 [13. 
November 2000]); Jelica Kurjak, Russia's Balkan Strategy (IWPR Balkan Crisis Report, Issue 181, 5 October 
2000), at: http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr/bcr_20001005_4_eng.txt; and Patrick Moore, Mr. Ivanov 
Comes Calling, RFE/RL Balkan Report, 23 March 2001, Volume 5, Number 22. For Russia's reaction to the 
Kosovo crisis see also: Kosovo: mezhdunarodnye aspekty krisisa [Kosovo: International Aspects of the Cri-
sis], pod red. D. Trenina i E. Stepanovoj, Moskva 1999, at: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1999/05dt/ 
default.asp?n=toc.asp. 
84  While not having objected to the establishment of the OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Russia wants to keep the Mission under tight control of the Permanent Council, where it has a veto, in order 
to exclude, that the Mission can pursue its own policy, or more exactly the policy of its Head of Mission, like 
it was perceived by Russia in regard to the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). Therefore the Rus-
sian Federation insisted "that the Secretary General will submit a report to the Permanent Council by 1 April 
2001 on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the 1999 report of the External Auditors, 
including the results of the investigation into spending by the Kosovo Verification Mission. Without taking 
into account the experience of the KVM, it will be difficult to organize the task of ensuring the proper func-
tioning of the new mission." (Interpretative statement under paragraph 79 [Chapter 6] of the Final Recom-
mendations of the Helsinki Consultations, PC.JOUR/315, 11 January 2001, Annex, at: http://www.osce.org/ 
docs/english/pc/2001/journals/pcoej315.htm). 
85  See Address by Mircea Dan Geoana, 11 January 2001, cited above (Note 24). 
86 See accordingly the information about the OSCE Mission to Georgia (at: http://www.osce.org/georgia/ 
index.php3), the OSCE Office in Yerevan (at: http://www.osce.org/yerevan/), the OSCE Office in Baku (at: 
http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey20.htm), and ODIHR projects for 2001 (at: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/cal2000_index.htm#rCau). 
87  See Karen Chaczaturov, Po sobstvennomu scenariyu. Stabil'nij Yuzhnyj Kavkaz - Vecznij interes Rossii 
[According to the own scenario. A stabile Southern Caucasus is Russia's eternal interest], Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 10 February 2001, at: http://www.ng.ru/printed/cis/2001-02-10/5_scenario.html; Dina Malysheva, 
Konflikty u Yuzhnykh Rubezhej Rossii [Conflicts at Russia's Southern Borders], in: Rossija i ee yuzhnye so-
sedi [Russia and her Southern neighbours] (Pro et Contra 5 [Summer 2000]), at: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/ 
p&c/Vol5-2000/3/v5n3-01.pdf. 
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Although decided on in Instanbul in 199988, it remains unclear whether the OSCE Assistance 
Group to Chechnya will return. On 7 February 2001 OSCE Chairman-in-Office Geoana met 
with his counterpart Ivanov to discuss this issue. Russia does not oppose the return of the As-
sistance Group but insists on solving technical and security related problems89, which was 
also Russian policy throughout 2000. The real issue behind the Russian position seems to be 
Moscow's fear of having an international presence on the ground that could witness human 
rights violations committed by the Russian military and security forces there. Moscow also 
objects to the fact that the so far unchanged mandate of the Assistance Group includes a po-
litical dimension, that is to "promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization 
of the situation in the Chechen Republic in conformity with the principle of the territorial in-
tegrity of the Russian Federation and in accordance with OSCE principles and pursue dia-
logue and negotiations, as appropriate, through participation in 'round tables', with a view to 
establishing a cease-fire and eliminating sources of tension."90 Russia seems to be willing to 
accept a role for the OSCE only on the condition that it determinates the political terms. 
 
In Georgia the expansion of the mandate of the OSCE Border Monitoring Mission "to ob-
serve and report on movement across the border between Georgia and the Chechen Republic 
of the Russian Federation"91 can be regarded as a successful operation with the aim of pre-
venting possible destabilisation through a spill-over from Chechnya. By contrast, the pros-
pects for a solution of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts remain very low. The 
South Ossetian side seems unready to accept broad autonomy within a unitary Georgian state, 
instead favouring a federal or confederal model. Although there has been some progress in the 
issue of refugee returns, and also on the question of future economic assistance to the region 
(with part of the money coming from the EU), the situation was aggravated in December 2000 
by Russia's introduction of a visa requirement for citizens of Georgia, from which Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia are exempt. This furthered the disintegration of the peace process, as did 
recent steps by North Ossetia, which is part of the Russian Federation, to create a free trade 
zone on the southern border embracing the unrecognised Republic of South Ossetia.92 In 
Abkhazia, where the UN has the lead role in mediating a solution, a breakthrough remains just 
as unlikely. The OSCE is concentrating on the issue of establishing a Human Rights Office in 
the Gali region in Abkhazia, in order to promote the return of Georgian refugees.93 
 
Finally, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh94 is dealt with 
by the OSCE Minsk Group, currently co-chaired by Russia, the US and France, which has 
                                                 
88  "We reaffirm the existing mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya. In this regard, we also wel-
come the willingness of the Russian Federation to facilitate these steps, which will contribute to creating 
conditions for stability, security, and economic prosperity in the region." (Istanbul Summit Declaration, 19 
November 1999, Point 23., cited above [Note 32]). 
89  See Romanian Foreign Minister in Moscow, RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 5, No. 27, Part I, 8 February 2001. 
90  See Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions. The OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya, 17 January 2000, at: 
http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey12.htm. 
91  Extension of the mandate of the border monitoring operation of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, PC.DEC/406, 
29 March 2001, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/englis h/pc/2001/decisions/pced406.htm. 
92  See Liz Fuller, Does North Ossetian Initiative Threaten Georgia's Territorial Integrity?, RFE/RL Caucasus 
Report, 25 January 2001, Volume 4, Number 4, at: http://www.rferl.org/caucasus-report/2001/01/4-
250101.html. 
93  For the latest developments in the Gali region see Robert McMahon, UN Envoy Hopes for Talks on Abk-
hazia's Status, REFE/RL Caucasus Report, 23 March 2001, Volume 4, Number 12. 
94  For background and devolpment of the conflict see f. ex.: Rexane Dehdashti, Internationale Organiationen als 
Vermittler in innerstaatlichen Konflikten. Die OSZE und der Berg Karabach-Konflikt, Frankfurt a. M. 2000 
(Studien der Hessischen Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Band 34); Sergiu Celac, The Nagorno-
Karabakh Question: An Update, Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 5, 1-2 (2000); Dittmar Schorkowitz, Der 
"Gordische Knoten" Kaukasiens. Acht Monate für die OSZE in Berg-Karabach, 14. November 2000, at: 
http://www.deutsch-armenische-gesellschaft.de/dag/shkbkr.htm. 
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been dealing with the question for almost 10 years without any success. The peace process 
gained new momentum in February 2001, when the three existing OSCE peace proposals 
were leaked to the public in Azerbaijan95 and caused extremely controversial discussions 
there and in other countries. On 3 April a new round of peace-talks was launched at Key 
West, which did not produce the hoped for major breakthrough.96 Both the Azeri and Arme-
nian leadership seem to be too weak to present the potentially unpopular solutions to their re-
spective publics. Therefore Russia and the US have a decisive role to play in putting pressure 
on the conflicting parties, but this is unlikely to happen before they themselves have struck a 
'big deal' which would establish a new framework for stability in that region, and not only 
there. Until this happens it would be more advantageous for both to keep these issues open, 
whenever that prevents the other from improving his strategic position. 
 
Central Asia. This region, in which the OSCE is present with a field activity in each of the 
five Central Asian states97, has faced a number of upheavals in 2000. Uzbekistan remained the 
centre of attempts by Central Asian Islamic militants based in Afghanistan to destabilize 
Central Asia. Tajikistan is still trying to recover from the five-year civil war which ended in 
1997 and has also been destabilised by the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan 
faced problems in the north, where the majority population consists of ethnic Slavs, and felt 
threatened by the wave of Islamic radicalism. Kyrgyzstan also faced growing security threats 
from Islamic radicals based in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Finally Turkmenistan became 
more and more isolated from the international community. All countries have in common a 
number of problems with their social and economic development, their human rights records, 
and a general trend in the direction of authoritarian rule. The region is also destabilised not 
only by the developments in Afghanistan, but also by the competition among its neighbours 
and the great powers for its enormous energy resources, and transportation routes.98 
 
The Russian Federation - one of the key players in this region – has several strategic interests, 
which can be summarised as follows: prevent the spread of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia, 
which would in turn endanger Russia; persuade the remaining Russian population not to leave 
the region in order to uphold influence; secure Russia's southern flank from outside influence 
                                                 
95  See Emil Danielyan and Liz Fuller, OSCE Karabakh Peace Proposals Leaked, RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 23 
February 2001, Volume 4, Number 8. The May 1997 proposal foresaw the resolution of all issues of a peace-
settlement in form of a package, with the division of responsibilities between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Kara-
bakh as a state and territorial formation within Azerbaijan to be decided later. This plan was accepted by Ar-
menia and Azerbaijan, but rejected by Nagorno-Karabakh. The same outcome had the September 1997 pro-
posal, which foresaw a step-by-step settlement. The latest plan, which was presented by the Co-Chairman-
ship of the Minsk Group of the OSCE in November 1998 aimed at a comprehensive settlement of the prob-
lem through the resumption of negotiations without preconditions, but was rejected by Azerbaijan this time. 
96  See No Obvious Progress Made at Armenian-Azerbaijani Summit, RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 5, No. 68, Part I, 
6 April 2001. 
97 An OSCE Mission to Tajikistan and OSCE Centres in Almaty, Ashgabad, Bishkek and Tashkent (in Decem-
ber 2000 the PC reformed the former Central Asian Liaison Office into a Centre, now with more focus on 
Uzbek affairs (PC.DEC/397, 14 December 2000, at: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2000/decision/ 
pced397.htm)). 
98  For developments in Central Asia see f. ex.: Ahmed Rashid, Central Asia Summary: Recent Developments in 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Eurasia Insight, 17 January 2001 (at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ 
articles/eav011701.shtml) and Central Asia Summary: Recent Developments in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan, Eurasia Insight, 18 January 2001 (at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/ 
eav011801.shtml); on the human rights situation: Rachel Denber, Central Asia and the Caucasus Repeat Past 
Mistakes on Human Rights, Human Rights, 21 June 2000 (at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ 
insight/articles/eav011801.shtml). 
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through military presence and closer military co-operation; prevent NATO getting a foot-hold 
in Central Asia; and have its share in the enormous energy resources.99 
Faced with this situation of insecurity, the OSCE will have to try to stabilise the region. Its 
best hopes for success will be through finding a way of addressing the security concerns of 
the Central Asian states. On the other hand, OSCE can not ignore the further deteriorating 
situation in the field of democracy and human rights. In order to address the military-political 
dimension of security the OSCE should pick up the loose ends of the Tashkent conference of 
October 2000, which marked a first step in the direction of regional co-operation. What is 
needed are concrete projects, not new declarations. If such projects could be developed, ide-
ally also with the support of other international organisations, the OSCE could also contem-
plate assuming the function of project co-ordinator under the guidance of the Chairman-in-
Office, but with a mandate going beyond the time limits of a chairmanship, which would add 
more sustainability and institutional memory to the efforts of the OSCE in this region. Nev-
ertheless, one has to be very cautious in expecting results from OSCE activities, which are not 
in themselves sufficient to make a real difference on the ground in Central Asia. 
 
Baltics and Eastern Europe. This last region to be reviewed in this article is of importance 
both to Russia and to the OSCE, which has a field presence in Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine. Perhaps of even greater importance than OSCE's field activities was 
and to a certain extent still is the involvement of the HCNM in Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine. 
 
Russia has vital strategic and security interests in the region which can be summarised as fol-
lows: to prevent the said countries from becoming new NATO members, which in the case of 
the Baltic states can not be totally excluded in the near future; to uphold its strategic positions 
on the Baltic Sea (Kaliningrad Oblast), the Black Sea (Crimea), and in Trans-Dniestr; to pro-
tect the Russian minorities in these states and to use them as a means to influence the policy 
of these respective states; to secure the economic and political reintegration of these countries 
without overburdening Russia's capacities, which is already being achieved in the case of Be-
larus and could be an future option for Ukraine, which is currently on the brink of possible 
destabilisation because of allegations against President Kuchma about a possible involvement 
into the murder of a journalist, or Moldova as well, where the Communist Party which won 
the recent parliamentary elections is thinking of joining the Belarussian-Russian Union; and 
finally to use the imminent eastward expansion of the EU (Baltic States) to bring Russia 
closer to Western markets. 
 
Baltic States. Latvia and Estonia want to see the work of the OSCE Missions come to an end 
because they feel stigmatised by their presence in the country. The more concrete the integra-
tion of Estonia and Latvia into EU and/or NATO becomes, the less politically acceptable are 
the Missions for them. OSCE is therefore considering terminating them by the end of 2001100, 
although it remains unclear if they will be replaced by some other form of representation in 
the region. 
 
In Belarus, the Advisory and Monitoring Group of the OSCE came under heavy pressure 
from the Lukashenko regime at the beginning of this year, so that the forced termination of its 
work could not be excluded at some point101. The OSCE adopted a hard stance in Belarus, 
                                                 
99 See f. ex.: Russia Rethinks Its Central Asia Strategy, Eurasia Insight, 20 March 2001, at: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032001.shtml. 
100  See Address by Mircea Dan Geoana, 11 January 2001, cite above (Note 24): "Based on the OSCE's assess-
ment of their progress we will recommend appropriate action be the end of the year 2001." 
101  Lukashenko accused the AMG of exceeding its mandate by training several thousands of future election 
monitors in human rights and election standards for the forthcoming presidential elections in Belarus. See 
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with the 2000 parliamentary elections not regarded as meeting international standards for 
democratic elections because of insufficient progress regarding transparency of the electoral 
process, access to the mass media, and meaningful powers for the new parliament. During 
their March visit to Belarus, the OSCE, EU and Council of Europe Parliamentary Assemblies 
formulated detailed criteria for the recognition of the forthcoming presidential elections as 
free and democratic, and also made it clear that there remain other serious concerns in the 
field of democracy and human rights.102 Should the majority of the Belarus population re-
elect Lukashenko in more or less democratic elections, the OSCE and other organisations or 
states could face the embarrassment of being forced to recognise his democratic credentials. 
 
In Moldova, finally, the OSCE is still trying to contribute to a solution to the Trans-Dniestr 
conflict. Retaining a commitment to the principle of territorial integrity of Moldova, the 
OSCE has to deal with three different, but nevertheless inter-related, issues. The first is the 
issue of the withdrawal of Russian forces and ammunition by the end of 2002, as stipulated in 
the 1999 Istanbul Summit Declaration.103 While some progress in the reduction of equipment 
and ammunition is possible, the withdrawal of Russian forces is quite a different matter, be-
cause - and this is the second issue - a part of it constitutes the Russian contingent of the 
peace-keeping forces which controls the security zone. It has already been mentioned above 
that Russia is keen to receive an OSCE mandate for its peace-keeping forces following a po-
litical settlement of the Trans-Dniestr conflict. In this third area early progress seems to be 
very unlikely, because the positions of the conflicting parties diverge too much. While Chisi-
nau is ready to grant the Trans-Dniestr region a large degree of autonomy, Tiraspol is more 
and more uncomprising and is aiming at nothing less than a confederation, which would leave 
the current leadership. It will be interesting to see if the Moldovan Communist Party, which is 
ideologically closer to its counterparts on the other side of the Dniestr than previous govern-
ments and thus has less excuse not to find compromise, can add new momentum to the peace-
talks. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Belarussian President Blasts OSCE Mission for Exceeding Mandate, RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 5, No. 19, 
Part II, 29 January 2001; and OSCE Denies Lukashenko's Charges of Anti-State Conspiracy, RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE Vol. 5, No. 20, Part II, 30 January 2001. 
102  Statement by OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Belarus elections, Chairman-in-Office Press Statement, 17 
October 2000, at: http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id=1160; and Parliamentary Troika issues 
statement on Belarus, Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus, Press Release, 7 March 2001, at: 
http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id=1526. 
103  See Point 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration, 19 November 1999, cited above (Note 32): "Recalling the 
decisions of the Budapest and Lisbon Summits and Oslo Ministerial Meeting, we reiterate our expectation of 
an early, orderly and complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova. […] We welcome the commit-
ment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova 
by the end of 2002." 
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